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Introduction
Prior research finds that earnings restatements are associated with higher CEO turnover rates, and that CEOs of restatement firms suffer significant labor market penalties (Desai, Hogan and Wilkins 2006) . However, surprisingly little research has been published on the consequences faced by chief financial officers (CFOs) of restatement firms. Recent legislation highlights the importance of CFOs with respect to financial reporting. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) was passed following a series of high-profile accounting scandals, in part to restore public confidence in financial reporting and audit quality. As the top executive primarily responsible for the preparation and filing of the financials (Mian 2001) , CFOs are named in SOX as one of two parties required to certify the fairness of the presentation of the annual and quarterly financials.
1 As part of the statute, accountability measures for CEOs and CFOs are codified and severe sanctions specified for executives implicated in fraudulent financial reporting. Richardson (2005) makes the case that the passage of SOX presents a natural experimental setting for examining the impact of changes in governance environments on ex post settling-up mechanisms. It follows that, if SOX has been successful in increasing the accountability of executives, then disciplinary actions taken against executives following earnings restatements and the subsequent labor market penalties faced by terminated executives could be more severe in the post-SOX period.
Our paper is the first to examine jointly the immediate and long-term restatement-related consequences faced by CFOs prior to and after the passage of SOX. We thus contribute to the literature by addressing two research questions. First, what are the immediate and longer-term disciplinary consequences faced by restatement-firm CFOs? Second, has the passage of SOX influenced the immediate and long-term disciplinary consequences to restatement-firm CFOs?
These two questions are important for a number of reasons. While research has recently begun to 1 Paragraph (a) of Section 302 of SOX refers to "the principal financial officer or officers" of the firms. The other responsible party in Paragraph (a) is the "principal executive officer or officers."
address the immediate impact of restatements on CFOs, no evidence exists on the longer term consequences faced by CFOs. 2 In addition, post-SOX CFO labor market penalties have not been examined; hence, it is unclear whether the passage of SOX has changed the dynamics of the disciplinary regimes faced by CFOs, either in the near term or over the longer term. Finally, documenting the immediate and longer-term consequences of restatements will allow us to better understand the costs faced by CFOs for aggressive and/or fraudulent reporting.
Implicit in the provisions of SOX is the notion that accountability standards were too low and existing corporate governance mechanisms were inadequate. However, if adequate governance and accountability practices were in place prior to SOX, then executives implicated in any accounting misstatements in the pre-SOX period would have been appropriately disciplined.
Some recent research does provide initial evidence on these immediate/short-term restatementrelated consequences faced by both CEOs and CFOs. Desai et al. (2006) focus on aggressive accounting and restatements in the pre-SOX period and show that CEOs and other top executives (President and Chairman) suffered significantly higher turnover rates following restatements.
Further, they found that the labor market penalties for the terminated executives were severe, with relatively few executives finding jobs that were equivalent to their prior position. Regarding
CFOs and the pre-SOX period, Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton and Dalton (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper (2007) both document a greater likelihood of CFO termination following earnings restatements. Also, concurrent working papers by Burks (2007) and Hennes, Leone and Miller (2007) examine but find no difference in short-term restatement-related CFO turnover rates between the pre-and post-SOX periods. The limited empirical evidence thus suggests that SOX had little impact on restatement-related CFO turnover rates. While concurrent research examines the influence of SOX on CFO turnover, this is the first paper to examine the longer-term 2 The research examining the immediate impact of restatements on CFO turnover includes one published paper by Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton and Dalton (2006) , and three concurrent working papers (Agrawal and Cooper 2007 , Burks 2007 , and Hennes, Leone and Miller 2007 .
consequences imposed on former CFOs of restatement firms, either before or after the passage of SOX.
The importance of, and interest in these issues are not just limited to academic researchers and regulatory authorities. Much has been made in the business press of the changing roles faced by CFOs (see, e.g., Forbes.com 2002) . One of these roles is the need for CFOs to maintain their integrity in the face of pressures from many constituents from within and from without the firm, and to maintain the reputation necessary to communicate credibly with these diverse constituencies. Today's CFO is the chief lieutenant and strategic partner of the firm's CEO. Increasingly, the CFO is speaking to more external constituencies. Internally, the CFO is the chief gatekeeper for new initiatives. And to top it off, in today's post-Enron World, the CFO has to be squeaky clean.
The implication of the increased importance of external credibility and the requirement that the CFO "be squeaky clean" is that the reputational effects of being implicated in an accounting misstatement can be potentially devastating to the subsequent career path of the executive. Desai et al. show that these reputational effects have long-term implications for displaced top executives, with relatively few CEOs finding employment equivalent to their prior positions.
To examine these questions, we identify 167 (196) firms in the pre-SOX (post-SOX)
period that restated earnings downward, and match each restatement firm with a control firm based on year, industry, size and age. For each restatement firm, we look for instances where the individual occupying the CFO position leaves the position involuntarily within two years of the restatement. We also track the former CFOs for up to four years to determine their subsequent employment. Using the restatement firm event window, we repeat this process for control firms to allow a comparison of CFO turnover and labor market consequences between restatement firms and control firms.
We find evidence of higher CFO turnover rates following restatements in both the preand post-SOX periods, which implies that governance mechanisms served to identify and discipline CFOs implicated in restatements in both periods. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that the passage of SOX has influenced CFO turnover rates. 3 In a sensitivity test, we repeat the turnover analyses using CEOs and also find higher rates of CEO turnover rates following restatements in both the pre and post-SOX period. Yet, we find no evidence that restatementrelated CEO turnover was influenced by SOX.
Turning to subsequent labor market penalties befalling former CFOs of restatement firms, we find that the labor market appears to impose stiff penalties. For example, former CFOs of restatement firms are less likely to find a position with a job title that is comparable to their prior CFO position, less likely to find employment in a publicly traded company, or less likely to find a comparable position in a public firm. In many cases, the penalties are quite severe, including penalties that would hinder the individual's ability to function as a CFO (e.g., loss of CPA certificate, barred from acting as an officer in a publicly traded firm), penalties involving criminal charges and legal issues (including prison), and financial penalties (e.g., fines, bonus disgorgement). Further, we find that the executives terminated in the post-SOX period appear to suffer greater reputational/labor-market penalties compared to the pre-SOX period, suggesting that firms are less willing in the post-SOX period to hire a former CFO with a tarnished
reputation. This appears to be consistent with the intent of the legislation to increase executive accountability.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature on restatements and the disciplinary consequences to executives, describes the accountability provisions of SOX relevant to our study, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and research methods, details our research methods and defines our empirical models.
3 While this is inconsistent with our expectations, it is consistent with the two working papers examining CFO turnover in the post-SOX period (i.e., Burkes 2007 , Hennes et al. 2007 Section 4 presents our univariate and multivariate results, along with descriptions of our sensitivity tests. Finally, Section 5 discusses our results and provides our concluding remarks.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Prior Research on the Characteristics of Restatement Firms
Prior research documents that restating firms tend to be in poorer financial condition than non-restating firms (e.g., Kinney and McDaniel 1989 , Defond and Jimbalvo 1991 , Desai et al. 2006 , and that restating firms suffer relatively severe declines in market value (Kinney and McDaniel 1989 , Turner, Dietrich, Anderson and Bailey 2001 , GAO-03-138, Wu 2002 , Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz 2004 . Other research suggests that a prime motivation for restating firms to manage earnings is the desire to attract lower-cost external financing (Richardson, Tuna and Wu 2002) . Collectively, prior research leads to the conclusions that misstatements are not the result of mathematical errors (e.g., Defond and Jimbalvo 1991, Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 2004) , that pressure from the capital markets is a key motivator for companies to engage in aggressive accounting (Richardson et al. 2002) , and that restating firms are penalized by the financial markets for engaging in earnings manipulation (e.g., Palmrose et al. 2004) .
Prior Research on Disciplinary Actions Following Restatements
A body of research has developed around the issue regarding the disciplining of corporate management for poor performance. A number of possibilities exist for how such a monitoring mechanism might be initiated and sustained. Fama (1980) suggests that the firm is always engaged in an active, ongoing search to identify potential replacements for managers performing at a sub-par level. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that, in the case of top management, the board of directors should represent the first line of defense for the shareholders in disciplining top managers. Other research suggests that, when internal control mechanisms, such as the board of directors, are not functioning properly, the external market for corporate control (i.e., through the takeover market) is another potential disciplining mechanism (e.g., Manne 1965 Manne , 1967 . Finally, Fama (1980) notes that the external financial and labor markets represent potential disciplining mechanisms. This implies that the financial markets impose discipline on firms through the market mechanism, while the market for corporate managerial talent would "settle up" ex post with the executive responsible for the misstatement by bidding down the labor capital of the executive. Desai et al. (2006) , Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper (2007) each study terminations of managers of firms that manipulated and subsequently restated earnings.
Desai et al. find that corporate boards terminate at least some of the top managers (defined as the CEO, President and Chairman) of these firms. Further, they report that terminated managers of restating firms subsequently find it difficult to gain similar employment with other firms.
Arthaud-Day et al. and Agrawal and Cooper extend this analysis to focus on CFOs as well, and find that the restatement event is associated with higher CFO turnover. All three of these studies examine restatements in the pre-SOX legal environment.
Similar to our study, two working papers (Burks 2007 and Hennes et al. 2007 ) look at CFO turnover in the pre-and post-SOX periods. However, neither of these studies finds reliable evidence that CFO turnover increased in the post-SOX environment. Burks asserts that this result is due to less severe restatements in the post-SOX period, while Hennes et al. argue that turnover was already high in the pre-SOX period. As we have noted previously, neither of these studies examines the longer-term labor market penalties faced by CFOs following termination. This suggests that the labor market aspects of the accountability issue remain unresolved.
Hypothesis Development
In summary, prior research finds that top managers are punished following earnings restatements in the pre-SOX period (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006 , Desai et al. 2006 , Agrawal and Cooper 2007 . Clearly, a number of the provisions in SOX are intended to hold CEOs and CFOs more accountable for the financial statements. Given their primary responsibility for the financial reporting process, we focus our research on the consequences faced by CFOs and specifically target the potential for differential labor market penalties in the post-SOX period. 4 The key CFO accountability provisions of SOX can be summarized as follows: (1 Desai et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper (2007) , the effect of SOX on postrestatement turnover may be muted. Also, consistent with the notion that pre-SOX governance mechanisms were functioning properly, the concurrent working papers by Burks (2007) and Hennes et al. (2007) find little evidence that post restatement CFO turnover rates differ between the pre and post SOX periods. While executives clearly had fiduciary duties to their shareholders prior to SOX and prosecutions for financial reporting fraud certainly occurred prior to the current round of scandals, the empirical question that remains to be answered is whether the passage of SOX with its more explicit provisions and sanctions has resulted in a fundamental change in the governance environment. If so, we suggest, similar to conjectures in prior research, that the passage of SOX should have immediate implications for governance mechanisms. For example, after the passage of SOX, we expect that boards may feel more justified in terminating CFOs following earnings restatement stemming from aggressive accounting practices. We also expect that investors will have less patience for earnings restatements in the post-SOX period, placing further pressure on the board to take action. This leads to our first hypothesis, stated in the alternate form:
H1:
The positive association between CFO turnover and accounting restatements will strengthen in the post-SOX period.
In addition to immediate firm-level disciplinary actions, displaced CFOs may suffer significant labor market penalties upon dismissal. Fee and Hadlock (2004) document that dismissed executives are less likely to make lateral moves upon leaving their firms, and are more likely to accept subsequent employment in inferior positions relative to their previous employment. Desai et al. (2006) find that executives terminated following a restatement faced significant labor market penalties, finding it difficult to gain similar employment with other firms in the pre-SOX period. Srinivasan (2005) finds that outside directors, especially members of the audit committee, face reputational costs (e.g., losses of board seats) as a result of the firm's financial reporting failure. The labor market penalties observed in these studies are consistent with ex post settling up in the market for corporate talent (Fama 1980) . However, prior research has not examined labor market penalties for CFOs, and we are not aware of any research examining the influence of SOX on labor market penalties.
Given the increased visibility of the CFO position as a result of SOX and the potential stigma and reputational losses associated with earnings restatements in the post-SOX environment, we expect that more serious labor market penalties are likely to accrue in the post-SOX period as well. If SOX results in more CFOs being accused of criminal activity, a greater proportion of terminated CFOs could become essentially unemployable as CFOs. Also, the emphasis on CFO integrity implicit in SOX may make CFOs with tarnished reputations less appealing to future employers, especially large public companies. Thus, the ex post labor market penalties may be more harsh in the post-SOX environment, with the result being that terminated CFOs will be less likely to obtain similar employment in the future. In addition, the increased criminal and civil sanctions codified by SOX suggest that more severe penalties will be imposed on CFOs in the post-SOX environment. These penalties can include prison time, fines, loss of professional certifications, disgorgement of bonuses, and permanent disbarment from serving as an officer of a public company. This leads to our second set of hypotheses, stated in the alternate form:
H2a: CFOs terminated following a restatement will face significant labor market penalties.
H2b: CFOs terminated following a restatement are more likely to suffer more severe penalties in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.
Research Design
Sample Construction and Matching Procedure
Sample Construction
We construct our sample based on a report released by the General Accounting Office on and December 31, 1999 for the pre-SOX subsample, and to firms announcing a restatement between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2003 for the post-SOX subsample. We limit our pre-SOX period to December 31, 1999 to reduce the likelihood that the events triggering SOX will influence earnings restatement disciplinary actions in our pre-SOX sample. We limit our post-SOX analysis to firms announcing a restatement no later than December 31, 2003 so that we have a long enough window to track displaced CFOs. 5 Applying this initial screen leaves us with 348 5 We are able to obtain precise termination dates for 65 displaced CFOs in the post-SOX period. These 65 CFOs represent 61% of all displaced CFOs in our post-SOX sample. The median number of days between the restatement date and the termination date for these 65 displaced CFOs is 321 (or approx. 11 months). Thus, the representative CFO in the post-Sox period leaves within one year of announcement of the (530) potential firms for the pre-SOX (post-SOX) subsample (only single-restatement firms are considered). Next, to validate the restatement and to identify the periods affected by the restatements and the restatement dollar amount, we search Forms 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 8-K, and relevant press releases. To accomplish this validation, we follow a similar methodology as that employed by the staff members of the GAO; specifically, we perform keyword searches using combinations of the firm name (and/or ticker symbol) and keywords (and variations of those keywords), such as "restate*" or "revis*" or "adjust*."
Panel A of Table 1 provides a reconciliation of our pre and post-SOX subsamples. We exclude a number of firms for several reasons. Specifically, in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) subsample, we exclude 61 (68) firms because we could not find them in the CRSP or Compustat databases, 49 (57) firms because they had CRSP share codes other than 10 or 11 (e.g., Real Estate Investment Trust, Exchange Traded Mutual Funds, Foreign Firms) or they were sold over-thecounter/pink sheets, 30 (79) firms for which we could find no 8-K, 10-K/A or 10-Q/A, 37 (113) firms because the restatement did not decrease net income, and 4 (17) firms because we could not find an appropriate matching firm. After these screens, our final pre-SOX (post-SOX) subsample is comprised of 167 (196) firms that overstated earnings.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the industry representation in our pre-and post-SOX subsamples. The industries with the highest representation are the Chemical, Industrial
Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Banking and Business Services. Our industry representation aligns closely to that reported in Desai et al. (2006) .
Matching Procedure
Similar to Desai et al. (2006) , we use a matched-pair design to conduct our analyses. We match each restatement firm to a control firm based on restatement year, two-digit SIC code, firm size (total assets) and firm age. Controlling for firm age is important because, as pointed out by restatement. Out of the 65 displaced CFOs, 38 relate to firms restating in 2003. This implies that, roughly speaking, we have around 3 years to track a displaced CFO whose firm announced the restatement in 2003. Desai et al. (2006) and others (see, e.g., Beneish 1999), the SEC is more likely to inspect young firms in the start-up stage. We require that the ratio of restatement firm total assets to control firm total assets be between 50 percent and 150 percent and that the difference in age between the restatement firm and the control firm be two years or less (Desai et al. 2006) . As shown in Panel A of Table 2 , the restatement firms and control firms do not differ in terms of age or size, suggesting that our matching procedure was successful.
CFO Turnover Definition
We identify CFOs of restatement and control firms by reading proxy statements (Form DEF-14A), 10-Ks or 8-Ks (Desai et al. 2006) . We classify a CFO turnover as restatement-related if the executive leaves the firm within 24 months following the announcement of the restatement (post-restatement period). For each matched control firm, we also examine CFO turnover in the restatement window. Since we are interested in identifying executives that depart for disciplinary reasons (i.e., their departure is involuntary and associated with the restatement), we follow Parrino (1997) as a guide. 6 As a reliability check, we examine CFO turnover in the 24 months prior to the restatement (i.e., the pre-restatement period). We expect that CFO departure rates will not differ between restatement firms and control firms in the pre-restatement period.
Identifying Employment Opportunities for Former CFOs
We next determine the subsequent employment status for all former CFOs, whether their departure was voluntary or involuntary, to identify future labor market opportunities for these executives. 7 We track each former CFO for up to four years and determine the first instance in which the individual is identified as a full-time employee at another firm. 8 In those instances where the CFO is identified as joining a private firm, we attempt to distinguish self-employed
CFOs (e.g., they created their own consulting or non-for-profit firm) from those obtaining jobs in established private firms. 9 We use the following procedure to track the former executives. First, using the combination of the CFO's name and the name of his or her previous employer, we search on Lexis-Nexis for press releases announcing the appointment of the executive to her or We then catalog the traceable executives into several partitions. Our first category is for CFOs who were able to find a job of any kind (GET_JOB). Our second category contains CFOs who were able to find a job with a comparable title or better. We consider those CFOs who were able to find a job as CFO or better (e.g., COO, CEO or chairman) as having obtained a comparable job (GET_COMP_JOB). Our third category contains CFOs who found a job in a publicly-traded firm (GET_PUBLIC_JOB). Our fourth category, (not tabulated for the sake of parsimony) contains CFOs that found a comparable job in a publicly-traded firm (GET_COMP_PUBLIC_JOB). Finally, we identify CFOs that faced severe penalties (e.g., disbarment from serving as executives of publicly-traded firms).
Multivariate Models
To examine the association between earnings restatements and the likelihood of involuntary CFO turnover, we estimate the following logit regression model (Model 1):
where (CFO turnover) = 1 if the CFO departs the firm involuntarily within 24 months after the restatement, and 0 otherwise; RESTATE = 1 if the firm restated its earnings, 0 otherwise; POST = 1 if the restatement takes place in the post-SOX period, 0 otherwise; and ε is a firm-specific error term. 11 The interaction term, RESTATE*POST, allows us to determine whether the sensitivity of CFO turnover to earnings restatements has changed in the post-SOX period. Prior research (e.g., Desai et al. 2006 , Arthaud-Day et al. 2006 ) leads us to expect a significantly positive coefficient on RESTATE, while our first hypothesis leads us to expect a significantly positive coefficient on
RESTATE*POST.
The remaining term in the model, Z, represents a vector of control variables that prior research has found to influence CFO turnover. We include CEOTURNOVER, which is coded 1 if the CEO leaves the firm (0 otherwise), to control for the team-nature in departures (Fee and Hadlock 2004) . We include BANKRUPT (MERGER), which is coded 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy (merges) within 24 months of the restatement announcement, 0 otherwise (Beneish 1999 , Gilson 1989 , Desai et al. 2006 . Finally, our model controls for performance, as prior research finds that poor performance increases the likelihood of management turnover (Warner, Watts and Wruck 1988; Desai et al. 2006) . We use market-adjusted buy-and-hold monthly returns (using the CRSP equally weighted index as the benchmark) estimated over the 12 months prior to the restatement announcement (BHAR12PRIOR) and the 12 months after the restatement announcement (BHAR12AFTER) as our market performance measures. In additional analyses, we also control for return on assets (ROA), and, when data are available, executive age (CFOAGE) and tenure (CFOTENURE), as these executive-specific variables have been found to affect executive turnover (Murphy 1999) .
To examine future labor market outcomes for former CFOs in a multivariate setting, we estimate a series of models examining the likelihood of obtaining various forms of future employment. Our approach is to estimate a logit model where the dependent variable (i.e., GET_JOB, GET_COMP_JOB, GET_PUBLIC_JOB or GET_COMP_PUBLIC_JOB) is coded as 1, 0 otherwise, for each of the four categories, and then to estimate an OLS model where the dependent variable is either SIZE_RATIO or SAL_RATIO. More formally, the following logit and OLS models are estimated, Models 2 and 3, respectively:
where RESTATE, POST and ε are as previously defined. As in Model 1, we include a vector of control variables, denoted Ω. In particular, the vector contains BHAR12PRIOR and BHAR12AFTER, BANKRUPT and MERGER, all as previously defined. Ω also contains the natural log of the previous employer's total assets to control for firm size, the age (in years) of the CFO (CFOAGE) and a control variable for retirements, where CFORETIRE = 1 if the CFO is beyond normal retirement age (i.e., age > 65), 0 otherwise. Our primary coefficients of interest are RESTATE and RESTATE*POST, which we predict will be significantly negative.
Results
Summary Statistics
Panel A, B and C of Table 2 present descriptive statistics for financial variables, executive-specific variables and restatement-specific variables. 12 As Panel A shows, the differences between restatement and control firms are limited to financial performance-related variables. 13 The mean (median) BHAR12PRIOR / BHAR12AFTER for restatement firms is -5% / -5% (-17% / -14%), and 6% / 1% (0% / -12%) for control firms. BHAR12PRIOR is significantly different between restatement firms and control firms while BHAR12AFTER is only marginally significant. This pattern of returns is consistent with prior research finding negative market performance prior to, as well as after, a restatement/GAAP violation (Desai et al. 2006; Beneish 1999) . Mean (median) ROA in the year prior to the restatement for restatement firms is -1% (5%) versus 6% (9%) in control firms (p < 0.01). We also find that operating accruals and total accruals (OPACC and TOTACC, respectively; both are scaled by lagged total assets) are significantly more negative for restatement firms relative to their counterparts. Moreover, relative to control firms, restatement firms are more likely to be the subject of an accounting and auditing enforcement release (AAER). Finally, restatement firms do not differ from control firms in terms of the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy (BANKRUPT) or merging with another firm (MERGER) within twenty-four months of the restatement. In general, the summary statistics in Table 2 , Panel A, indicate that accounting and market performance in restatement firms is lower than that in control firms.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that there are no significant differences in the executive specific variables between restatement and control firms. Panel C of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for restatement specific variables after partitioning between the pre and post-SOX periods. The mean and median restatement amounts are not significantly different between the pre-SOX period (mean = $16.40 million, median = $3.18 million) and the post-SOX period 12 To mitigate the influence of outliers, we winzorize all continuous variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. We obtain qualitatively the same results using non-winzorized variables. 13 The patterns for financial and executive-specific variables are similar in the pre-and post-SOX periods, so we do not tabulate them separately.
(mean = $20.17 million, median = $2.26 million). The mean (median) cumulative daily abnormal return 5 days prior to and 5 days after the restatement (CAR55) is -9% (-7%) in the pre-SOX period and -3% (-3%) in the post-SOX period. Both mean and median CAR55 are significantly different between the two periods, suggesting that, consistent with Hennes et al., the incidence of relatively benign restatements may have increased in the post-SOX period. A possible explanation could be that firms sought to address both major and minor reporting issues that might have been present in previously released financial statements, thus leading to a more muted mean/median reaction.
14 Further, the mean (median) restatement amount scaled by lagged total assets (RESTATEMENT/TA) is 6% (2%) in the pre-SOX sample, while it is 6% (1%) in the post-SOX period. Only the median for RESTATEMENT/TA is significantly different across periods.
We do not find a significant difference in the incidence of AAERs between the pre and post-SOX period. However, we find that the mean number of months it takes to issue an AAER is dramatically lower in the post-SOX period (22.6 months) relative to the pre-SOX period (42.8 months). This suggests that, while the number of violations prosecuted by the SEC does not necessarily change post-SOX, the speed at which the SEC acts does. Table 3 presents summary statistics on CFO turnover. In Panel A, we partition CFO turnover by voluntary (i.e., unambiguous retirements and promotions) and involuntary rates. We find that CFO turnover rates are roughly identical (~14%) between restatement firms and control firms in the pre-restatement period (p = 0.83). As expected, in the post-restatement period, the CFO turnover rate in the restatement firms (~58%) is significantly higher (p < 0.01) than the control firm CFO turnover rate (~24%). It is important to note that the differences in CFO turnover rates in the post-restatement period are driven by involuntary turnover.
Univariate CFO Turnover Analyses
14 The CAR55 of -9% in the pre-SOX sample is consistent with Palmrose et al. (2004) . Also, the decline in CARs in the post-SOX period is consistent with Burks (2007) , who documents a similar decline.
In Panel B of Table 3 , we examine differences in involuntary CFO turnover rates between the pre-and post-SOX periods. Contrary to our expectations, the evidence suggests that SOX has not influenced the likelihood of CFO turnover following an earnings restatement. In Panel C of Table 3 , we report the mix of CFO departures and CEO turnovers for restatement firms. Consistent with Mian (2001) and Fee and Hadlock (2004) , we find that CFO departures are often associated with CEO departures. In the full sample, 29.8% of the restatement firms had both their CEO and CFO depart, 11.9% had their CEO depart and the CFO stay, 26.7% had their CEO stay and the CFO depart, and 31.7% had both their CEO and CFO stay. In examining the pre-and post-SOX periods, it appears that there has been a shift in the post-SOX period away from having both the CEO and the CFO depart to having both the CEO and the CFO stay.
Summary Statistics for Restatement Firms Partitioned by CFO Turnover
In Table 4 , we compare restatement firms with involuntary CFO departures to restatement firms without involuntary CFO departures in order to better understand the firm characteristics associated with restatement-related CFO turnover. In Panel A, we find no significant difference in firm size or firm age between CFO turnover and non-CFO turnover firms. We find that restatement firms with CFO turnover have significantly lower prerestatement ROA, lower book-to-market ratios and more negative accruals than restating firms without CFO turnover. We also find that CFO turnover restatement firms had a greater proportion of restatements resulting in AAERs (28%) relative to non-CFO turnover restatement firms (12%). In Panel B, we examine executive-specific variables and find CFO tenure is significantly lower in CFO turnover restatement firms (mean of 4.2 years) than in non-CFO turnover restatement firms (mean of 5.3 years). No other differences are evident.
In Panel C of Table 4 , we examine restatement-specific variables. We find that shortwindow cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., [-5, +5] ) are significantly more negative in CFO turnover restatement firms (-8%) versus non-CFO turnover restatement firms (-3%), and that the restatement amount scaled by assets is significantly larger in CFO turnover restatement firms (0.08) versus non-CFO turnover restatement firms (0.04). We also find some marginally significant evidence (p = 0.10) that restatements in turnover firms were more likely to affect revenue accounts than restatements in non-turnover firms. Taken together, these results suggest restatement firms involuntarily terminating their CFOs have lower pre-restatement performance, and have more severe restatements than those retaining their CFOs.
Multivariate CFO Turnover Analyses
In Table 5 Specifically, firm performance, mergers, and CFO age and tenure are significantly associated with the likelihood of CFO turnover in the predicted directions. With respect to CEO turnover influencing CFO turnover (Fee and Hadlock 2004) , we find that, in all of our models, the likelihood of CFO turnover significantly increases when the CEO also leaves the firm (in every model, the CEOTURNOVER coefficient is approximately 1.00 with p < 0.01).
The coefficient for RESTATE is positive and significant (p < 0.01) in all models, indicating that restatements increase the likelihood of CFO turnover in the pre-SOX period, which is consistent with Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper (2007) . Regarding the post-SOX period, summing the coefficients on RESTATE and RESTATE*POST for each of the three models in Panel A yields estimated coefficients of 1.58, 1.58 and 2.01, respectively.
The tests of whether these sums differ reliably from zero yield respective Z-statistics of 6.09 (p < 0.01), 5.79 (p < 0.01) and 5.02 (p < 0.01). These tests imply that CFOs implicated in restatements in the post-SOX period are more likely to leave their respective firms relative to those at non-restating firms. In the first two models, the coefficients for POST and RESTATE*POST are insignificant, suggesting that the likelihood of CFO turnover does not increase in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period. 15 In the third model, the coefficient for POST (-.90) is significantly negative (p = .02) and coefficient for RESTATE*POST (.82) is approaching significance (p = .13). Taken together, model three results suggest that control firm CFO turnover is lower in the post-SOX period, while the offsetting coefficients for POST and RESTATE*POST suggest that restatement firm CFO turnover is unchanged in the post-SOX period. However, it should be noted that data requirements for model three (i.e., CFO age and tenure) result in a loss of roughly 50% of the sample. While the lack of an association between the passage of SOX and an increased likelihood of restatement-related CFO turnover is contrary to our hypothesis H1, it is consistent with two working papers (Burks 2007 , Hennes et al. 2007 ). When we estimate the marginal effects (dy/dx) implied by the restatement, our results suggest that, after controlling for other important economic determinants, the restatement increases the likelihood that CFOs are terminated by approximately 30% in both the pre-and post-SOX periods.
In Panel B, rather than using an indicator variable for restatements, we use various measures of the severity of the restatement. It is possible that the effect of SOX on CFO turnover may be conditional upon the severity of the restatement. Therefore, in Panel B, we examine three measures of the severity of the restatement. The first measure is the restatement amount scaled by assets (RESTATEMENT/TA). The second measure is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns for the five days (i.e., [-5, +5] ) surrounding the restatement announcement date (CAR55). Finally, we create an indicator variable that is coded one if the restatement ultimately results in the SEC issuing of an AAER (AAER). We interact each of these alternative restatement variables with the post-SOX indicator variable POST. Similar to our previous analyses, we also control for CEO terminations, bankruptcy, mergers, and stock market performance both prior to and after the restatement. We anticipate positive coefficients on RESTATEMENT/TA and AAER, implying that relatively larger restatements and the incidence of an AAER will increase the likelihood of turnover. On the other hand, we anticipate a negative coefficient on CAR55, which would imply that more negative market reactions to the announcement of the restatement are associated with greater likelihood of CFO turnover.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we find that each restatement variable is significantly related to CFO turnover in the pre-SOX period, although CAR55 is only marginally so (p = 0.06).
Consistent with our results in Panel A, RESTATEMENT/TA*POST and AAER*POST are insignificant (p = 0.14 and p = 0.47, respectively), indicating that SOX did not influence the relationship between CFO turnover and these two measures of restatement severity. However, the CAR55*POST interaction is highly significant (p = 0.01), indicating that a more negative market reaction to the restatement announcement in the post-SOX period is associated with a greater likelihood of the CFO leaving the company. 
Univariate CFO Labor Market Penalty Analyses
In Table 6 , we perform univariate tests examining subsequent labor market activities for former CFOs. 17 Desai et al. (2006) find that top managers terminated following a restatement suffered labor market penalties. We therefore expect post-departure employment opportunities for restatement-firm CFOs will be significantly less attractive than opportunities available to control-firm CFOs. Further, it is possible that CFO reputation will play a larger role in hiring 16 This result is consistent with our second hypothesis; however, intuitively, it is puzzling given the reduced market reaction to restatements in the post-SOX period. Care should be taken in interpreting this result because post-SOX returns may be influenced by the higher incidence of innocuous restatements in the post-SOX period noted in Hennes et al. (2007) . In fact, we find that the coefficient of variation is approximately 70% larger in the post-SOX period, which could be related to differences in the nature of restatements between the pre-and post-SOX periods. It is possible that the significant coefficient on CAR55*POST is influenced by the larger variation in CAR55 in the post-SOX period. Further, in other analyses discussed later, we find that the coefficient on CAR55*POST is insignificant when examining CEO turnover. Hence, this result is somewhat ambiguous.
decisions in the post-SOX period. Therefore, we expect that CFO departures in the post-SOX period will be characterized by even more negative subsequent employment outcomes. Table 6 , Panel A, examines whether former CFOs successfully obtain a new job. In every sample partition (i.e., full sample, pre-SOX period and post-SOX period), we find at least marginally significant evidence that former CFOs of restatement firms found jobs at lower rates than former CFOs of control firms. For example, using the full sample, we were able to document that 70% of former control-firm CFOs were able to find another job compared to only 50% of former restatement-firm CFOs (p < 0.01). However, the likelihood of former restatement-firm CFOs finding another job is not statistically different between the pre-SOX (54.4%) and post-SOX (46.7%) periods (p = 0.26).
In Panel B of Table 6 , we examine the likelihood that former CFOs will find a job with a comparable job title or better (i.e., CFO, CEO, COO or Chairman). In every sample partition, we find statistically significant evidence that former CFOs of restatement firms are less likely to find a comparable job than former CFOs of control firms. In the full sample, we observe that 58.3%
of former control-firm CFOs obtain comparable jobs, while only 26.4% of former restatementfirm CFOs find comparable positions (p < 0.01). In the pre-SOX period, 36.6% of former restatement-firm CFOs find comparable jobs, while, in the post-SOX period, only 16.8% of former restatement-firm CFOs find comparable jobs (p < 0.01). The data thus suggest that former restatement-firm CFOs are roughly twice as likely to find a job of equal or better quality before the passage of SOX.
Panel C of Table 6 reports on the likelihood that former CFOs will find employment at another publicly-traded company. In every sample partition, we observe that former control-firm CFOs are more likely to find a job in a public company than are former restatement-firm CFOs.
In the pre-SOX period, 33.6% of former restatement-firm CFOs find employment at a public company (including demotions to non-CFO positions in the same public company), while, in the post-SOX period, only 24.3% of former restatement-firm CFOs find a job in a public company.
However, the difference between the pre-and post-SOX periods is only marginally significant (p = 0.14).
In Panel D of Table 6 , we report the ratio of new salary to old salary, and the ratio of new firm size to old firm size for former CFOs with a new job (where salary and firm size data are available). Desai et al. (2006) find that top executives departing restatement firms who were able to find a job tended to find a lower-paying job in a smaller company. We find evidence that the ratio of new salary to old salary and the ratio of new firm size to old firm size are significantly smaller for former restatement-firm CFOs than for former control-firm CFOs. Additionally, for former restatement-firm CFOs, we find that the ratio of new firm size to old firm size is significantly smaller (p = 0.04) in the post-SOX period (0.95) than in the pre-SOX period (1.79),
suggesting that former restatement firm CFOs are finding employment in smaller firms after the passage of SOX. We do not find a difference in the ratio of new salary to old salary for former restatement-firm CFOs between the pre-and post-SOX periods.
In Panel E of Table 6 , we examine severe penalties imposed on former CFOs. We develop three broad classifications of severe penalties. Specifically, a penalty is classified as severe if (1) the former CFO's ability to function as a CFO in the future is impaired (e.g., s/he is barred from acting as an officer in a public company or s/he lost her/his CPA certificate), (2) the former CFO faces criminal or legal issues, or (3) the former CFO incurs financial penalties (e.g., civil penalties, restitution or bonus disgorgement). 18 Of the 208 former restatement-firm CFOs, 57 (27.4%) face such severe penalties. In contrast, only two of the 84 former control firm CFOs (2.4%) faced severe penalties. The most common form of severe penalty involves legal issues, which affects 39 (or 68.4 %) former restatement firm CFOs. On a univariate basis, there are no statistically significant differences in severe penalties between the pre-and post-SOX periods for former restatement firm CFOs. This is surprising given the intent of SOX to impose greater criminal liability on CFOs and the bonus disgorgement provisions in SOX.
Multivariate CFO Labor Market Penalty Analyses
In Table 7 , we report the results of multivariate analyses of labor market penalties using the various measures of labor market penalties described in Table 6 . In each model, we control for market returns, assets, bankruptcy, mergers, CFO age and CFO retirements. The multivariate results are generally consistent with the univariate results presented in Table 6 . CFOs leaving restatement firms are less likely to find (1) a job, (2) a job with a comparable title or better (i.e., CFO, CEO, COO or Chairman), (3) a job in a public company, (4) a comparable job (or better) in a public company (i.e., CFO, CEO, COO or Chairman), or (5) a job with a salary that is equal or greater to their prior salary.
With respect to SOX, in four of the six models, the RESTATE*POST interaction is at least marginally significant (p ≤ 0.10), suggesting that labor market penalties befalling former CFOs of restatement firms are significantly greater following the passage of SOX. To assess the economic significance of our results, we also calculate the marginal effects implied by each of the estimated RESTATE/RESTATE*POST coefficients on the respective employment outcome probability. We find that, in the pre-SOX period, former restatement-firm CFOs are roughly 20% less likely to find a job, a comparable job, or a comparable job at a publicly traded firm. More interestingly, in the post-SOX period, relative to the pre-SOX period, former restatement-firm
CFOs are approximately 25% less likely to find a job, a comparable job, or a comparable job at a public firm. The results suggest that CFO reputation may play a larger role in employment decisions in the post-SOX period. Thus, SOX appears to have increased the ex post settling-up costs for CFOs forced out of office as the result of a restatement.
Sensitivity Analyses
CEO Turnover
We perform a sensitivity test to determine if the influence of SOX on CEO turnover is similar to that reported for CFO turnover above. In the CEO models, we include all control variables from the CFO models, with the obvious exception of the CEO turnover variable. We add a control variable for CEO/Chairman of the board duality to control for CEO entrenchment.
Results of the CEO analyses are consistent with those reported for CFOs, with one exception.
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We do not find evidence that CEO turnover is more sensitive to market returns (CAR55) following SOX.
Earnings Restatement Classifications
To examine the possibility that only certain types of restatements are associated with a higher rate of CFO turnover and/or are influenced by SOX, we partition restatements between those that affect revenue accounts versus those that do not affect revenue accounts, those After estimating the models, for each restatement classification, there is evidence of significantly higher involuntary CFO turnover rates in both the pre-and post-SOX periods. It does not matter whether the restatement affects revenue accounts or not, whether the restatement results in the issuance of an AAER or not, or whether the restatement affects core or non-core earnings. In every restatement classification, the restatement is associated with higher 19 Because of the similarity of the sensitivity results to the results already reported in the paper, and for the sake of parsimony, we do not tabulate the sensitivity analyses.
involuntary CFO departure rates. Importantly, we find no evidence that the passage of SOX influences the relationship between CFO turnover and any of the restatement classifications.
Alternate Turnover Window
In our prior analyses, we classify a CFO departure as restatement-related if it occurred within the 24 months following the restatement. It is possible that the board of directors took disciplinary actions prior to the formal announcement of the restatement. To determine how this possibility may affect of our results, we extend our restatement turnover window to include the 12 months prior to the restatement announcement. Out of the 93 CFOs (47 from restatement firms and 46 from control firms) that departed involuntarily 24 months prior to the announcement of the restatement, 31 departed 12 months prior to the restatement announcement (19 from restatement firm and 12 from control firms). After re-classifying the 31 departures occurring in the 12 months prior to the restatement announcement as restatement-related CFO turnover, we find results similar to those reported in the tables. 
Alternate Post-SOX Window
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine involuntary CFO turnover and CFO labor-market penalties associated with earnings restatements. In addition, we examine the possibility that SOX has increased the penalties incurred by CFOs of restatement firms. Our analysis is motivated by the scant published research on the consequences befalling CFOs of restatement firms, and by the implied intent of SOX to increase the accountability of CFOs. Our main results suggest that CFOs of restatement firms face an increased likelihood of termination, and they document the first evidence that former restatement-firm CFOs face relatively severe labor-market penalties.
Further, our results generally suggest that SOX had little effect on CFO turnover rates. More importantly, we provide the first evidence that passage of SOX is associated with increased labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms.
The results of our study thus should be of interest to academic accountants, to regulatory authorities, and to business executives and their constituencies. Specifically, with respect to CFO turnover, we provide evidence that calls into question the notion that internal governance/disciplinary mechanisms were either inadequate or functioning improperly in the pre-SOX period, and that penalties for financial misstatements were insufficient. The comparable CFO and CEO turnover rates between the pre-SOX period and the post-SOX period are subject to two potential (not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations. One possibility is that governance mechanisms may have been sufficiently robust in the pre-SOX period to adequately address the need to take immediate actions to address financial reporting problems. The other possibility is that SOX has not significantly impacted the governance environment influencing the short-term disciplinary actions imposed on CFOs. On the other hand, our results clearly show that the subsequent labor-market penalties imposed on displaced CFOs in the post-SOX period are more severe compared to the pre-SOX period. This result has not previously been documented. Our evidence is thus consistent with Fama's (1980) ex post settling-up hypothesis, and complements prior research examining the labor-market penalties imposed on the CEO as a result of earnings restatements (Desai et al. 2006) . The increased labor market penalties in the post-SOX period suggest that a tarnished reputation is more costly for CFOs following the passage of SOX. This suggests that SOX has led to greater accountability of CFOs, which is one of the intended effects of the legislation. Our source of restatements is the GAO -06 -1053R report. The pre-SOX (post-SOX) sample covers the years 1997-1999 (2002-2003) . The control firms used in the study are selected based on 2-digit SIC code, firm size (total assets) and firm age (in years).
The variables are defined as follows: ASSETS represent the firm's total assets (Data Item 6) at the beginning of the restatement year; FIRM AGE is calculated as the number of years from the CRSP BEGDAT field to the restatement year; BHAR12PRIOR (BHAR12AFTER) is market-adjusted buy and hold returns estimated over months -12 to -1 (+1 to +12) relative to the restatement month. BANKRUPT is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm files for chapter 11 within 24 months after the restatement, 0 otherwise; AAER is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm, or its CEO or its CFO are issued an AAER against them, 0 otherwise; MERGER is a is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is involved in a merger or acquisition within 24 months after the restatement. CEOAGE is the age of the CEO; CEOTENURE is number of years the CEO has been in office; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO holds both, the CEO and chairman of the board positions, 0 otherwise; CFOAGE is the age of the CFO; CFOTENURE is number of years the CFO has been in office; RESTATEMENT is the restatement amount (in millions); CAR55 is the cumulative abnormal return calculated 5 days prior to 5 days after the restatement announcement date;; RESTATEMENT/Ta is the restatement amount scaled by ASSETS at year t-1; RESTPERIODS is the number of years affected by the restatement; REVENUE is a dummy variable coded 1 if the restatement affected a revenue account, 0 otherwise; EXPENSE is a dummy variable coded 1 if the restatement affected an expense account, 0 otherwise; OTHER is a dummy variable coded 1 if the restatement affected an item other than a revenue or expense account, 0 otherwise.
All continuous variables are winzorized at the 1st and 99 th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. The number of matched pairs varies across categories due to missing data either in the restatement or control firm. Only pairs with complete data are included in the analysis. The variables are defined as follows: ASSETS represent the firm's total assets (Data Item 6) at the beginning of the restatement year; FIRM AGE is calculated as the number of years from the CRSP BEGDAT field to the restatement year; BHAR12PRIOR (BHAR12AFTER) is market-adjusted buy and hold returns estimated over months -12 to -1 (+1 to +12) relative to the restatement month. BANKRUPT is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm files for chapter 11 within 24 months after the restatement, 0 otherwise; AAER is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm, or its CEO or its CFO are issued an AAER against them, 0 otherwise; MERGER is a is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is involved in a merger or acquisition within 24 months after the restatement. CEOAGE is the age of the CEO; CEOTENURE is number of years the CEO has been in office; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO holds both, the CEO and chairman of the board positions, 0 otherwise; CFOAGE is the age of the CFO; CFOTENURE is number of years the CFO has been in office; RESTATEMENT is the restatement amount (in millions); CAR55 is the cumulative abnormal return calculated 5 days prior to 5 days after the restatement announcement date;; RESTATEMENT/Ta is the restatement amount scaled by ASSETS at year t-1; RESTPERIODS is the number of years affected by the restatement; REVENUE is a dummy variable coded 1 if the restatement affected a revenue account, 0 otherwise; EXPENSE is a dummy variable coded 1 if the restatement affected an expense account, 0 otherwise; OTHER is a dummy variable coded 1 if the restatement affected an item other than a revenue or expense account, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable, CFO turnover, is a categorical variable coded 1 if the CFO is involuntarily terminated 24 months after the restatement announcement date.
The independent variables are defined as follows: RESTATE is a categorical variable coded 1 if it is a restatement firm, 0 if a control firm; RESTATEMENT/TA is the restatement amount scaled AASETS at year t-1; CAR55 is the cumulative abnormal return calculated 5 days prior to 5 days after the restatement announcement date; AAER is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm, or its CEO or its CFO are issued an AAER against them, 0 otherwise; POST is a dummy variable coded 1 in the post-SOX period (2002) (2003) , 0 otherwise; CEOTURNOVER is coded 1 if the CEO was terminated 24 months after the restatement announcement date, 0 otherwise; BANKRUPT is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm files for chapter 11 within 24 months after the restatement, 0 otherwise; MERGER is a is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is involved in a merger or acquisition within 24 months after the restatement; BHAR12PRIOR (BHAR12AFTER) is market-adjusted buy and hold returns estimated over months -12 to -1 (+1 to +12) relative to the restatement month. BHAR12PRIOR and BHAR12AFTER are relative to the CRSP equally weighted index; ROA is calculated as operating income before depreciation (Data Item 13)/ [(ASSETS at year t + ASSETS at year t-1)/2]; CFOAGE is the age of the CFO; CFOTENURE is number of years the CFO has been in office.
All continuous variables are winzorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers.
The varying number of matched pairs varies across variables due to missing data either in the restatement or control firm. Only pairs with complete data are included in the analysis.
Z-Statistics are based on White (1980) standard errors. Inferences are based on one-tailed tests when a directional prediction is made. GET_JOB is a dummy variable coded 1 if the displaced CFO found a job after the restatement, 0 otherwise; GET_COMP_JOB is a dummy variable coded 1 if the displaced CFO found comparable job (as CFO, COO, CEO of Chairman of the Board), 0 otherwise; GET_PUBLIC_JOB is a dummy variable coded 1 if the displaced CFO found a job at a publicly traded firm after the restatement, 0 otherwise;
We obtain our labor market consequences data by tracking displaced CFO. We use the following procedure to track displaced CFOs. First, we try to find press releases announcing the appointment of the manager to their new position using Lexis-Nexus. We use the combination of their name and the name of their previous employment. Next, we search the following databases that provide biographical information about executives: Mergent Online, Forbes.com's People Tracker, LinkedIn.com and ZoomInfo People Search. Finally, as a last resource, we searched the executive using Google and Market Visual.com. Once we identify the executive, and assuming his/her new employer is a publicly traded firm, we search the new employer's filings to obtain the firm size (total assets) and new salary information (if the CFO makes it to the top five highest paid executives).
* As discussed in the text, this analysis excludes unambiguous retirements. 
